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CASE NOTE
Public Employee Pension Benefits-A PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AP-
PROACH----Chrisensen v. Minneapolis Muni'cial Employees' Retirement Board,
331 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1983).
Historically, courts and legislatures viewed public employee pension
benefits as gratuities.' The gratuity approach to public pensions allowed
legislative modification or elimination of retirement benefits without re-
gard to the employee's interest in the pension.2 Employee challenges to
legislative changes in benefits rarely succeeded. 3
As pension benefits became a more substantial part of a public em-
1. See, e.g., Eddy v. Morgan, 216 I11. 437, 449, 75 N.E. 174, 178 (1905) (Public pen-
sions are "a bounty springing from the graciousness and appreciation of sovereignty.");
Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 309, 110 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (1961) (statute or ordinance
granting a grauity to a public employee is not intended to create private, contractual or
vested right); Halek v. City of St. Paul, 227 Minn. 477, 480, 35 N.W.2d 705, 707 (1947)
(statutory provisions for payment of retirement pensions create no contractual or vested
rights); Hessian v. Ervin, 204 Minn. 287, 289, 283 N.W. 404, 405 (1939) (employee had no
vested right in pension fund, at least until he retired); Gibbs v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't
Relief Ass'n, 125 Minn. 174, 176, 145 N.W. 1075, 1076 (1914) (employee has no vested
right in pension).
2. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960); Gibbs v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 125 Minn. 174, 145 N.W. 1075
(1914).
In Gibbs, the court held that the legislature could amend the statutory definition of
"widow" to make the plaintiff, an employee's widow, ineligible for pension payments,
both earned and future. Id. at 176, 145 N.W. at 1076.
In Flemming, the appellee was deported from America for having been a member of
the Communist Party from 1933 to 1939. At that time, membership in the Communist
Party was not a basis for deportation. After 18 years of payments to the Federal Insurance
Contribution Act, Congress passed a law which cut off benefits for anyone deported from
this country because of past Communist Party membership. The government deported
the appellee and discontinued payments to him and his wife. The Supreme Court over-
turned a district court decision, and held that the law did not violate appellee's fifth
amendment due process rights. 365 U.S. at 605-06.
In Richardson, the appellee received social security disability benefits of $388.70 for
three months. The next month the federal payment was reduced to $225.30 under an
"offset" provision of the Social Security Act. The "offset" provision was invoked because
the appellee was receiving worker's compensation benefits from the state of West Virginia.
The Supreme Court held that the statute was not so arbitrary that it violated plaintiff's,
fifth amendment due process rights. The "offset" provision did not apply to persons re-
ceiving private insurance coverage or separate tort recoveries in addition to social security
disability payments. 404 U.S. at 78.
3. See supra note 1. Employees have frequently challenged legislative changes in
their pension benefits. Id The courts, however, have been unsympathetic to these efforts.
See generally Pension Task Force, Subcom. on Labor Standards, House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Interim Report on Activities I (Comm. Print 1976).
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ployee's compensation package, many jurisdictions abandoned the gratu-
ity approach. 4 The majority of jurisdictions replaced the gratuity
approach with a contract theory of public employee pension rights.5 In
Minnesota, public employee pension cases followed two paths.6 While
the majority of Minnesota Supreme Court decisions continued to follow
the gratuity approach, a significant number of decisions applied the con-
tract theory analysis. 7 Although the court varied its analytical approach,
the reasons for these variations remained unexplained.8
In the case of Christensen v. Minneapolis Municipal Employees' Retirement
Board, 9 the Minnesota Supreme Court faced the task of reconciling these
two divergent lines of case law. Plaintiff Christensen brought an action
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Minneapolis Municipal
Employees' Retirement Board when his pension benefits were suspended
in April 1980.10 Christensen retired and began receiving his pension
benefits in 1974, after twenty-three years of city service. I In 1980, the
legislature enacted a statute, 12 which imposed a new minimum age re-
4. See Donaldson v. Mankato Policeman's Benefit Ass'n, 278 N.W.2d 533 (Minn.
1979); Fossbinder v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 254 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1977);
Sandell v. Saint Paul Police Relief Ass'n, 306 Minn. 262, 236 N.W.2d 170 (1975); Sylvestre
v. State, 298 Minn. 142, 214 N.W.2d 658 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Dothan, 279 Ala. 571, 188 So. 2d 532 (1966); Yeazell v.
Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d 541 (1965); Jones v. Cheney, 253 Ark. 926, 489 S.W.2d 785
(1973); Abbott v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal. App. 2d 511, 332 P.2d 324 (1959); Police
Pension and Relief Bd. of Denver v. McPhail, 139 Colo. 330, 338 P.2d 694 (1959); Hanson
v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 446 P.2d 634 (1968); Singer v. Topeka, 227 Kan. 356,
607 P.2d 467 (1980); Brazelton v. Kansas Pub. Emp. Retire. Sys., 227 Kan. 443, 607 P.2d
510 (1980); State ex. rel. Evans v. Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 138 Mont. 172, 355 P.2d 670
(1960); ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5; MICH. CONST. art. 9,
§ 24; N.Y. CONST. art. V., § 7.
6. Compare Halverson v. Rolvaag, 274 Minn. 273, 143 N.W.2d 239 (1966); Slezak v.
Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 110 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Halek v. City of St. Paul, 227 Minn. 477,
35 N.W.2d 705 (1949); Johnson v. State Emp. Retire. Ass'n, 208 Minn. 111, 292 N.W. 767
(1940); Gibbs v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 125 Minn. 174, 145 N.W. 1075
(1914) (all following the gratuity approach) with Donaldson v. Mankato Policeman's Ben-
efit Ass'n, 278 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979); Sandell v. Saint Paul Police Relief Ass'n, 306
Minn. 262, 236 N.W.2d 170 (1975); Stevens v. City of Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n,
124 Minn. 381, 145 N.W. 35 (1914) (all adopting a contract form of analysis).
7. See supra note 6.
8. See Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Emp. Retire. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740 (Minn.
1983). "Thus we see that our case law over the years has not remained wedded to the
gratuity approach, but has at times, without always articulating the reasons therefor, used
a contract analysis." Id at 746.
9. 331 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1983).
10. Id. at 742.
11. Id Christensen began working for the City of Minneapolis in 1951. From 1951
to 1964 he worked part-time as an election helper. In 1965, Christensen was elected to the
Minneapolis City Council, where he served until 1974. In 1974, at the age of 38, Christen-
sen resigned from city service. Id
12. Act of February 7, 1980, ch. 342, § 22, 1980 Minn. Laws 6, 20 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 422A. 156 (1982)). In 1978, the legislature amended section 422A.09, subdivision
[Vol. 10
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quirement for elected officials' eligibility for pension benefits.13 Because
the statute had retroactive impact, Christensen's benefits were suspended
until he reached the newly imposed minimum age of sixty, a twelve year
wait. 14
Christensen challenged the statute as an unconstitutional impairment
of his employment contract with the city.15 The trial court rejected this
contention, characterizing Christensen's pension as a gratuity.16 In the
lower court's view, the new minimum age requirement was valid and did
not violate Christensen's constitutional rights.17
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed this holding.18 The court re-
jected both the gratuity and the contract approaches, and instead fash-
ioned a third and somewhat novel approach, characterizing the
3(2) of the Minnesota Statutes to subject elected officials to the same minimum age re-
quirement for eligibility as had always been the case for nonelected employees. Act of
March 23, 1978, ch. 562, § 3, 1978 Minn. Laws 262, 266. The 1980 Legislature added
section 422A. 156 which gave retroactive effect to the 1978 amendment. The current ver-
sion as amended reads:
From and after February 8, 1980, nothing contained in section 422A.09, subdivi-
sion 3, clause (2) shall be construed as allowing payment of a retirement allow-
ance or other retirement benefits other than a disability allowance pursuant to
section 422A.18 if otherwise eligible to any former, present or future elective
officer of the city of Minneapolis who has not attained the age of at least 60 years
unless the elective officer has received credit for at least 30 years of services and
retires pursuant to section 422A.15, subdivision 1.
MINN. STAT. § 422A.156 (1982).
13. MINN. STAT. § 422A. 156 (1982). The new minimum age was set at 60. Id
14. 331 N.W.2d at 743. Christensen began receiving monthly pension benefits of
$355.19. In 1978, these benefits were raised to $369.40 per month. Christensen elected to
receive a lower monthly payment so that later monthly payments could be made to his
surviving spouse. At the time Christensen's benefits were suspended, he was 38 years old,
meaning that he would have to wait 12 years to again become eligible for benefits. At age
60, Christensen's benefits would be $622.69 per month. Id at 742-43.
15. Id at 743. Christensen also alleged that the statute deprived him of property
without due process of law. Id The court refused to consider this theory of recovery
because it involved an "extension of the somewhat dubious doctrine of 'substantive' due
process." Id at 748.
The property right analysis originated in Spina v. Consol. Police & Fireman's Pension
Fund Comm'n, 41 N.J. 391, 197 A.2d 169 (1964), in which the court held that government
employees had a property interest in the funds of the pension system. Id The court in
Christensen confined itself to an analysis of the constitutional impairment issues raised by
the plaintiff. 331 N.W.2d at 749-52.
16. 331 N.W.2d at 742. The Christensen court explained the trial court's action as
follows:
The trial court, believing itself bound by earlier decisions of this court char-
acterizing a government pension as a gratuity, held that the legislature was not
prohibited by the constitution from imposing, as to employees already retired, an
age requirement of 60 years before benefits could be paid where previously there
had been no age requirement.
d
17. Id
18. Id. at 752.
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plaintiff's interest in his pension in terms of promissory estoppel.19
The doctrine of promissory estoppel provided the court with a flexible
method for evaluating public employee pension rights. 20 The Christensen
court considered two factors: "(1) What has been promised by the state?
and (2) To what degree and to what aspects of the promise has there
been reasonable reliance on the part of the employee?" 2 1 The court held
that the state had promised Christensen a pension after a prescribed term
of city service with no mention of a minimum age requirement. 22 Chris-
tensen relied on this promise when he chose to become a contributing
member of the pension fund in 1966.23 Once Christensen elected to be-
19. Id at 747. "We think today a public employee's interest in a pension is best
characterized in terms of promissory estoppel." Id The court did not cite any authority
or case law supporting this type of analytical approach. Only one other state has consid-
ered the idea of applying a promissory estoppel analysis to the area of public pension law.
See Crumpler v. Board of Admin. Emp. Retire. Sys., 32 Cal. App. 3d 567, 108 Cal. Rptr.
293 (1973).
The elements of promissory estoppel are set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts section 90: "(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forebearance on the part of the promissee ...and which does induce such
action or forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of
the promisee." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); see also Grouse v.
Group Health Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (effect of promissory estoppel is to
imply contract in law where none exists in fact); Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 304
Minn. 275, 283, 230 N.W.2d 588, 593 (1975); Constructors Supply v. Boston Sheet Metal
Workers, 291 Minn. 113, 116, 190 N.W.2d 71, 74 (1971). In Constructors Supply, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court quoted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90 to establish the
elements of promissory estoppel and characterized the doctrine as "a species of or substi-
tute for consideration." Id at 116, 190 N.W.2d at 74.
20. 331 N.W.2d at 747. The court also believed promissory estoppel to be a "realistic,
fair and practical" doctrine. See also Note, Pub/ic Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Ditress,
90 HARV. L. REV. 992, 998 (1977).
21. 331 N.W.2d at 749. The court noted that "[e]stoppel applies only to avoid injus-
tice." Id In Village of Wells v. Layne-Minnesota Co., 240 Minn. 132, 60 N.W.2d 621
(1953), the Minnesota Supreme Court made it clear that the foundation of estoppel is
justice. Id at 141, 60 N.W.2d at 627.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also applied equitable estoppel against the state
in order to avoid injustice. See Mesaba Aviation Div. v. County of Itasca, 258 N.W.2d
877, 880 (Minn. 1977). The equities of the circumstances must be examined and the gov-
ernment estopped if justice so requires, weighing in that determination the public interest
frustrated by the estoppel.
Other courts have also employed the equitable estoppel analysis against the govern-
ment. See Crumpler v. Board of Admin. Emp. Retire. Sys., 32 Cal. App. 3d 567, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 293 (1973) (equitable estoppel serves as mechanism within which courts accommo-
date interests of pensioners and government); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d
462, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423 (1970); Shafer v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 618, 521 P.2d 736
(1974).
22. 331 N.W.2d at 749. "At no time while he [Christensen] was in municipal service
did the legislature modify its promise of a pension by attempting to impose a minimum
age requirement." Id
23. Id Under section 422A.09 of the Minnesota Statutes, city employees are divided
into two classes: contributing and exempt. MINN. STAT. § 422A.09 (1982). The contrib-
[Vol. 10
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss2/4
CASE NOTE
come eligible for pension benefits, the state was estopped from denying
his right to those benefits.24
The court's decision to apply promissory estoppel analysis to public
employee pension benefits found little support in prior case law, either in
Minnesota or other jurisdictions.25 Nevertheless, the court viewed the
doctrine as a preferable alternative to the gratuity and contract
approaches.
26
The gratuity approach developed at a time when few government
workers received pensions, and the benefits they did receive were rela-
tively insignificant in amount. 27 Today, pension benefits comprise a sub-
stantial portion of an employee's compensation package. The court
could no longer adhere to a form of analysis which defined pensions as "a
bounty springing from the graciousness and appreciation of the sover-
eignty." 28 The abandonment of the gratuity theory was a necessary step
uting class consists of general municipal employees who are required to contribute to the
pension plan. The exempt class members are persons holding elective office, except for
municipal court judges. Elected officials choose to become members of the contributing
class and to be covered under the pension plan upon written application. 331 N.W.2d at
749.
Christensen worked for the city of Minneapolis part-time from 1951 to 1964. In 1965,
he was elected to the Minneapolis City Council and served on the council from 1965 until
1974 when he retired. At the time of trial, Christensen worked part-time as a janitor and
groundskeeper. Id at 742-43.
24. Id at 749.
25. See supra note 19.
26. 331 N.W.2d at 746-48. The gratuity approach was justified in the past when
pension benefits were insignificant in amount. See Note, supra note 20, at 997. In 1942,
less than 50% of the over three million state and local public employees were enrolled in
some type of pension program. By 1960, over 75% of seven million public employees had
retirement programs. See Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans-The Nature of the Em-
ployee's Rights, 1968 ILL. L.F. 32, 33 n.3 (1968). Thus, pension coverage has expanded
while increasing numbers of public employees are reaching retirement age and beginning
to collect benefits. Increasingly, pension funding is insufficient to cover the amount of
promised benefits. See Fritz, The Growing Challenges of Providing Pensions to State & Local Civil
Servants in an Aging Socety, 3 INT'L J. OF PUB. ADMIN. 405 (1981).
27. In 1939, the average civil servant received $978 per year upon his retirement. For
1940 and 1941, the figures were $965 and $932, respectively. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1941. Currently, the average civil servant re-
ceives approximately $1,036 per month upon his retirement. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982.
28. Gibbs v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 125 Minn. 174, 177, 145 N.W.
1075, 1077 (1914) (quoting Eddy v. Morgan, 216 I11. 437, 449, 75 N.E. 174, 178 (1905)).
Today, however:
[T]he universally recognized primary objectives of retirement plans are to enable
the employer to attract better employees, to reduce turnover, to facilitate orderly
retirement of older employees, to retain valuable employees who might seek
more productive employment elsewhere, and most importantly from the em-
ployee viewpoint, to assure a measure of income upon retirement adequate to
allow the annuitant to live in reasonable security. These objectives, of increasing
importance in private employment, are even more critical in government person-
nel policy as, with few exceptions, government cannot compete with private in-
19841
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toward bringing public employee pension law into conformity with pres-
ent day employment practices. 29
The court did not adopt the majority rule which analyzes public em-
ployee pension benefits in terms of a contract theory. 30 The court stated
that a contract approach precluded the analytical flexibility necessary to
the evaluation of public pensions. 31 Conceptual difficulties created by
statutory disclaimers of contract rights further influenced the court's de-
cision to reject the contract analysis approach. 32
Promissory estoppel enabled the court to consider equitable factors of
fairness and justice, an impossibility using a gratuity or strict contract
form of analysis.33 By using a promissory estoppel approach, the court
protected the employee's pension rights, without locking either party into
an agreement which might require future legislative modification.34
In the second portion of its analysis, the court considered the issue of
whether the statutory modification of Christensen's pension benefits con-
stituted a valid exercise of the state's police power. 35 Like a contract, a
promise enforced by estoppel contains an implied condition that its
terms can be modified under the state's police power.3 6 The exercise of
dustry salary levels, and must rely heavily upon the equalizing factor of an
attractive and liberal retirement plan.
Cohn, supra note 26, at 40.
29. 331 N.W.2d at 746-47. The court expressly overruled the Gbbs case and all prior
cases using the gratuity approach. Id at 747. For previous cases using the gratuity ap-
proach, see supra note 6.
30. 331 N.W.2d at 746-48. The court stated that most jurisdictions using the contract
approach have a constitutional provision defining the contract rights. Id at 747; see supra
note 5; see also Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass. 847, 303 N.E.2d 320 (1973); Birnhaum
v. New York State Teachers Retire. Sys., 5 N.Y.2d 1, 176 N.Y.S.2d 984, 152 N.E.2d 241
(1958); Note, supra note 20, at 998.
31. See 331 N.W.2d at 748. The court noted that the state has the ability to make an
offer and at the same time categorically deny the existence of any contract rights. Id.
Statutory disclaimers deprive state employees of any vested interest in their pensions. See,
e.g., MINN. STAT. § 353.38 (1982) ("Nothing done under the terms of this chapter and acts
amendatory thereof shall create or give any contract rights to any person"); id § 354.07,
subd. 8 ("No provision of this chapter shall create or give any contract rights to any per-
son."); id. § 352.022 ("No provision . ..shall create or give any contract rights to any
person.").
Yet, under the Minneapolis Municipal Employees Retirement Plan, there is no dis-
claimer of contract rights. 331 N.W.2d at 748. Thus, it remains unclear why the court felt
compelled to avoid the contract theory approach given the fact that contract rights did
exist between the plaintiff and the Retirement Board. Disclaimer clauses have created the
greatest problem for courts wishing to apply a contract analysis to similar situations. See,
e.g., Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d 541 (1965); Birnbaum v. New York State
Teachers Retire. Sys., 5 N.Y.2d 1, 152 N.E.2d 241, 176 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1958).
32. 331 N.W.2d at 748.
33. Id;see Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (1981).
34. See infra notes 42-44.
35. 331 N.W.2d at 749.
36. Id. ;see Minneapolis Gas Go. v. Zimmerman, 253 Minn. 164, 184, 91 N.W.2d 642,
656 (1958). In Zt'mmerman, the court stated that: "all contracts made by the state are
[Vol. 10
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the state's police power is, however, always subject to the constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contracts.
3 7
In evaluating the issue of contractual impairment, the court adopted a
three-part test recently set forth by the United States Supreme Court:
3 8
(1) Has the state law operated as a substantial impairment of contrac-
tual obligation?
3 9
(2) If so, was there a significant and legitimate public purpose behind
the law?4°
(3) In light of this purpose, was the adjustment of the rights and re-
sponsibilities of the parties upon reasonable conditions and of a charac-
ter appropriate to the public purpose justifying the adoption of the
law?
4 1
The court balanced the need for public employees to reasonably rely
upon the state's promise of a retirement program against the state's con-
cern for the financial integrity of the pension fund, as well as for the
financial soundness of the state as a whole.
42
The court found that the twelve year suspension of benefits constituted
a substantial impairment of Christensen's rights. 43 Because only nine
entered into subject to the implied condition that they are ever subordinate to a reason-
able and proper exercise of the state's inalienable police power." Id.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 11. The United States
Supreme Court has construed the contracts clause to mean that the states reserved the
power to modify contracts when the public interest requires. See Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1
(1977); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); see also White Motor
Corp. v. Malone, 599 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1979); Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 253
Minn. 164, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958); Naftalin v. King, 252 Minn. 381, 90 N.W.2d 185
(1958).
38. Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983).
39. The legislation is subjected to increased scrutiny as the severity of the impairment
increases. 331 N.W.2d at 750-51.
40. Id at 751.
41. Id
42. Id. The court also noted that the entire test is applied with more scrutiny when
the state tries to impair a contract to which it is a party. "Complete deference to a legisla-
tive assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-
interest is at stake." United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977), quotedzin
Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Emp. Retire. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 751 (Minn. 1983);
see also Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697, 705-06
n. 14 (1983).
The state argued that it was unreasonable for an employee to claim justified reliance
on a lifelong pension prior to the age of 60. The state's interest in enacting the statute was
presumably to correct past mistakes and to insure the integrity of the pension fund for
disabled and aged employees. 331 N.W.2d at 751.
43. The court stated that:
Applying the Energy Reserves three-part test to those claims makes it obvious that
the state's concern in correcting any inequities in the city's pension plan must
yield to the employee's need to be secure in his expected retirement benefits.
First, the suspension of retirement benefits until age 60 is a substantial impair-
ment of the contract terms. It may be a prudent alteration; correcting an ineq-
1984]
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people were affected by the retroactive application of the statute,44 the
state could not claim that the integrity of the pension fund, or of the
entire state budget, was in jeopardy.45 As a result, the court held that
the statute was invalid as an unconstitutional impairment of contract
with respect to elected city officials, already retired and collecting pen-
sion benefits at the time the statute was enacted.46
The court based its decision to adopt promissory estoppel as its mode
of analysis upon the conflicting needs of the state and its employees.
47
The state must retain the ability to modify public pension benefits when
other state interests, such as a financially sound state budget, are at
stake.48 Yet, the state offers attractive pension plans in order to attract
and retain qualified employees who would otherwise seek higher paying
private sector jobs.49 These employees have a legitimate interest in their
pension benefits, which the court must protect from unfair or unreasona-
ble legislative changes.
While promissory estoppel provides flexibility for evaluating public
pension benefits, it also introduces an element of uncertainty into the
area of public pension law. Evaluating public pension benefits in terms
of "reasonable reliance," "fairness," and "manifest injustice" invites liti-
gation by public employees claiming reliance upon the state's promises.
With every statutory modification of benefits, a public employee could
claim that an "injustice" occurred. The subjective standards of promis-
sory estoppel require a case by case evaluation for virtually every individ-
ual affected by statutory changes in the pension law.
Furthermore, promissory estoppel prevents the state from accurately
assessing its outstanding pension liability. In times when the state is con-
stantly struggling to balance the budget and maintain accurate account
of the state's financial status, certainty should be a paramount concern in
the evaluation of public pension benefits.
The court placed little emphasis on the state's concern for the financial
security of the pension fund.50 Originally, pensions developed to provide
support for those no longer able to work, as well as to allow the govern-
uity or a fiscal misjudgment can be a significant and legitimate public purpose,
as the second prong of this test requires.
331 N.W.2d at 751.
44. Id. at 751.
45. Id The record showed that Christensen had paid $7,051.51 into the retirement
fund. At the time his benefits were suspended he had already received $27,380.86 in pay-
ments. At the time of Christensen's retirement the actuarial value of his retirement allow-
ance was $73,872.61. For all nine employees affected by the retroactive application of the
statute, the unfunded liability of the pension fund was $258,655.02. Id.
46. Id at 752.
47. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
48. Se supra note 36 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 44.
[Vol. I0
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ment to attract and retain qualified employees in public service.51 To-
day, cities and taxpayers cannot afford to provide a lifetime monthly
allowance to every former civil servant. Pensions were never intended to
allow an individual capable of earning a living to retire at the age of
thirty-eight. 52 The legislative attempt to remove this financial burden
from the pension fund may have been an effort to correct past inequities
in the pension system and to preserve the integrity of the state pension
fund for public employees who are unable to work, or who have reached
the normal age for retirement.
In the future, if the court is again faced with the issue of public em-
ployee pension rights, it should reconsider its decision to adopt promis-
sory estoppel. A contract theory approach would provide certainty for
both the state and its employees, allowing for prudent long-range
financial planning by each. The contract approach would also en-
courage careful drafting of legislation that would change or modify pen-
sion benefits.
The contract approach would provide certainty without sacrificing
flexibility. As the court in Christensen noted, any contract binding on the
state can be modified by the state's police power.53 Minor modifications
of benefits effected without reaching the level of a substantial impair-
ment of contractural obligations preclude the employee from instituting
litigation. Drastic modifications of pension benefits could be scrutinized
using the three-part test delineated above.54 This analysis could be ac-
complished without the need for a preliminary investigation to deter-
mine upon which benefits the employee had "reasonably relied" in the
past. 55
The court acted properly in eliminating the outdated notion of public
pensions as gratuities. In its effort to provide flexibility for the state and
its employees, however, the court introduced an unnecessary element of
uncertainty into an area of law where certainty should be a primary con-
cern. In the future, the court should consider adopting the contract anal-
ysis now used by the majority of jurisdictions. This approach would
allow the state and its employees to plan their retirement programs,
while providing the flexibility needed in this area of the law.
51. See Cohn, supra note 26, at 45.
52. See id
53. See supra note 36.
54. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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